Evolution of Rules in  a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities by Stake, Jeffrey E.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2005
Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System:
Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other
Perpetuities
Jeffrey E. Stake
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, stake@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stake, Jeffrey E., "Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities" (2005).
Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 178.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/178
401 
EVOLUTION OF RULES IN A COMMON LAW 
SYSTEM: DIFFERENTIAL LITIGATION OF THE FEE 
TAIL AND OTHER PERPETUITIES 
JEFFREY EVANS STAKE* 
  I.   INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................  401 
 II.   COMPETITION AMONG LEGAL SYSTEMS CAN LEAD TO EFFICIENT RULES .........  403 
 III.   MECHANISMS INTERNAL TO THE COMMON LAW CAN LEAD TO...........................   
   EFFICIENT RULES...............................................................................................  404 
           A. Judges as the Directive Agents in the Development of Efficient Law .....  404 
           B. Efficiency Resulting from Processes Internal to the Common Law.........  406 
 IV.   THE COMMON LAW PROCESS FAVORS EFFICIENT RULES ...................................  407 
             A. Differential Investment: Litigants on the Side of Efficiency  
    Fight Harder..............................................................................................  407 
           B.    Differential Litigation: Inefficient Decisions Are More  
                 Frequently Challenged ..............................................................................  408 
                1. Some Kinds of Inefficient Rules Are Challenged More Often..........  409 
                2.  The Fee Tail .......................................................................................  410 
                     (a)   The Inefficiency of the Fee Tail .................................................  411 
                     (b)   Evolution of the Fee Tail and Subsequent Perpetuities ...........  415 
                     (c)   Differential Selection Can Lead to Efficiency ...........................  419 
                3.    A Counterexample—Diving Board Liability ....................................  420 
               4.    The Tail of the Fee Tail Tale ............................................................  421 
 V.   CONCLUSION........................................................................................................  423 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In our common law system, courts have the power to make new 
law and to change old law. As Judge Posner might say, judges are 
not potted plants.1 They make law by deciding specific cases. For 
each case, there are at least two possible outcomes. In most cases, 
one of these outcomes will be more efficient than the other; that is to 
say, one outcome will generate greater total welfare in the future. Af-
ter Posner argued that much of the common law could be explained 
in terms of efficiency,2 Paul Rubin set forth an evolutionary theory of 
how the common law, pushed by an invisible hand, might evolve to 
an efficient set of rules.3 His seminal idea was that disputes involv-
ing inefficient rules would settle less often than disputes involving ef-
ficient rules, with the result that litigation would more frequently 
overturn inefficient rules.4 George Priest extended Rubin’s thesis, ar-
                                                                                                                    
 * Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; I thank Greg Mitchell, Elinor Os-
trom, Marco Janssen, Michael Price, and Christopher Stake for their encouragement and 
comments, and Sarah Jenkins for her research assistance.  
 1. Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 8, 1987, at 
23. 
 2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, § 9.8, § 23.3 
(1972). 
 3. Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). 
 4. See id. at 61.  
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guing that inefficient rules should generate larger stakes and, hence, 
more frequent litigation.5 And the discussion has continued to this 
day.6 This Article presents a variation on the Rubin-Priest theme, of-
fering the fee tail and similar restraints on alienation as examples of 
how inefficient rules can lead to inefficient uses of land, which cause 
owners to seek the help of courts in freeing their lands from the inef-
ficient constraints. Unlike bad decisions in some tort cases, bad deci-
sions in property cases may return to the courts for reconsideration. 
In other words, there is a feedback loop, a mechanism that returns 
the output of a system back to the system’s input, that provides 
courts with opportunities to overturn inefficient common law prop-
erty rules. 
                                                                                                                    
 5. George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977). 
 6. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON LAW 35-44 (1997); 
Peter H. Aranson, Economic Efficiency and the Common Law: A Critical Survey, in LAW 
AND ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGULATION 51 (J. Matthias Graf von der 
Schulenburg & Goran Skogh eds., 1986); Peter H. Aranson, The Common Law as Central 
Economic Planning, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 289 (1992); Martin J. Bailey & Paul H. Rubin, A 
Positive Theory of Legal Change, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 467 (1994); Robert Cooter & 
Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); Michael A. Crew & Charlotte Twight, On the Efficiency of Law: A 
Public Choice Perspective, 66 PUB. CHOICE 15 (1990); Louis DeAlessi & Robert J. Staaf, The 
Common Law Process: Efficiency or Order?, 2 CONST. POL. ECON. 107, 107-12 (1991); Vincy 
Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 
116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003); John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of 
Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of 
Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1992); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics 
and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & ECON. 1 (1982); Avery Katz, 
Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1988); 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 591 (1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private 
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic 
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001); Evan Osborne, What’s Yours 
Is Mine: Rent-Seeking and the Common Law, 111 PUB. CHOICE 399 (2002); George L. 
Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980); Mario J. Rizzo, 
Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
291 (1980); Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980); Mark 
J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); Paul H. 
Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982); Paul H. Rubin, 
Christopher Curran & John F. Curran, Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by 
Rent Seekers, 107 PUB. CHOICE 295 (2001); Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Effi-
ciency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (providing a 
thumbnail summary of key contributions to the efficiency debate); Paul H. Rubin, Predict-
ability and the Economic Approach to Law: A Comment on Rizzo, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 
(1980); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. 
L.J. 1447, 1477-92 (1991); R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common 
Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981); Georg von Wangenheim, The Evolution of Judge-Made 
Law, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 381 (1993); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency 
in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003) (providing 
both an overview and an important discussion of the “supply-side” efficiency ramifications 
of the competition among courts); Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 
(1983).  
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II.   COMPETITION AMONG LEGAL SYSTEMS CAN LEAD TO 
 EFFICIENT RULES    
 External competition can eliminate inefficient legal systems.7 Le-
gal systems compete with each other, and those that allow efficient 
use of resources will have survival advantages over others that are 
less efficient. An inefficient legal system—one in which resources are 
underutilized or wasted, one in which there are inadequate incen-
tives and opportunities for production—undermines itself in a num-
ber of ways. A system that does not generate enough output for a suf-
ficiently strong military may be conquered by invaders. A nation’s 
survival depends on its ability to repel such attacks. There are two 
components to a legal system that can repel attacks. First, the sys-
tem must create sufficient incentives and opportunities for produc-
tion, and second, the system must have a mechanism for allocating 
some portion of its output to public goods such as defense.  
 As another example, an inefficient legal system may fail to pro-
vide food for its people. Starving people may be eager to overthrow 
the system and replace it with a new system. Even attempts with a 
low probability of success may be rational if conditions are bad 
enough. Nor do conditions have to be that extreme for people to rec-
ognize that some other legal regime could generate greater material 
wealth. The information revolution allowed people of the former So-
viet Union to learn that other legal systems with markedly different 
rules regarding the ownership of capital were producing greater con-
sumer wealth.  
 Hernando De Soto has extended this observation about the impor-
tance of property beyond the differences between capitalism and 
communism to smaller differences between capitalist legal systems.8 
Such observations can lead to revolution and a subsequent copying of 
the apparently more successful system. Legal systems might be seen 
as organisms that compete for human adherents, the essential nutri-
ents that allow them to survive and multiply. Since replicating bits of 
cultural information are called memes, perhaps legal replicators 




                                                                                                                    
 7. For two reasons, this does not mean that surviving systems are efficient. First, 
the competition is not finished, and never will be. Second, having the ability to survive 
over a long period of time may not be the same thing as being efficient. See Roy Radner, 
Economic Survival, in FRONTIERS OF RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC THEORY: THE NANCY L. 
SCHWARTZ MEMORIAL LECTURES, 1983-1997, at 183-209 (Donald P. Jacobs et al. eds., 
1998).  
 8. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS 
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). 
404  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:401 
 
 A similar sort of competition can exist within a nation. Following 
Adam Smith,9 Todd Zywicki has examined the English market for 
systems of rules and the competition that existed between courts.10 
The courts of law competed with the courts of equity for business, 
and he argues that the courts offering the more efficient rules were 
more attractive to the parties.11 Thus, the courts had an interest in 
offering better legal schemes.12 He calls this a “supply-side” push in 
the direction of economic efficiency and argues that it may coexist 
along with a demand-side pull.13 
III.   MECHANISMS INTERNAL TO THE COMMON LAW CAN LEAD TO 
EFFICIENT RULES 
 My primary concern here is not with those sorts of macroscopic le-
gal competition, where systems of rules fight for adoption and sys-
tems need to be efficient to survive. My concern here is whether one 
legal system in particular, the common law, is biased toward effi-
ciency because of internal forces rather than external competition. 
There are at least five different ways the common law might, without 
any external competition, evolve toward efficiency. Three theories 
cast judges as the directive agents in the development of efficient 
law. Clearly, if judges are biased, that might be manifested in their 
opinions. These theories are summarized in Part III.A. In the other 
two theories, the selection or litigation of cases by parties is the en-
gine of efficiency. If a rule is inefficient, benefits may be realized 
from replacing it. Part III.B introduces these two theories and the 
remainder of the Article explores them in more detail. These five 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, so some or all may play a 
part in the evolution of laws. 
A. Judges as the Directive Agents in the Development of  
 Efficient Law    
 The most obvious theory is that judges seek to achieve societal 
goals, and one of those goals is efficiency. Those judges with formal 
economic training might be especially likely to apply economic prin-
ciples in their judging. Judges without formal training may learn the 
principles and desirability of economics through informal culture. 
                                                                                                                    
 9. “During the improvement of the law of England there arose rivalships among the 
several courts.” ADAM SMITH, Report Dated 1766, in LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 423 
(R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978); see also HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE 
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (Harvard, 1983); Bruce L. Benson, The 
Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644, 652-54 (1989). 
 10. See Zywicki, supra note 6.  
 11. See id. at 1585.  
 12. See id.  
 13. Id. at 1553.  
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“Waste not, want not” expresses the general warning to be efficient; 
“Don’t throw good money after bad” teaches us to ignore sunk costs.14 
Judges are selected, in part, because they are expected to make deci-
sions that are good for society, decisions that achieve widely shared 
goals. It seems likely that, if efficiency is a cultural priority, judges 
will give substantial weight to that value in their decisions. One 
problem with this hypothesis—that judges have consciously sought 
efficient results—is that they have not made this value explicit in 
their writings. If efficiency were a primary goal, we would expect 
more references to economic principles than we find in their opinions. 
 It is also possible that judges lean toward efficient decisions with-
out intending to do so, unaware of their inclination. To some extent, 
judges do what comes naturally. There are evolutionary reasons to 
believe that humans have a distaste for inefficiency. Since ineffi-
ciency is essentially wastefulness, those who had the power to per-
ceive inefficiency and had the inclination to avoid it would have had 
more resources with which to survive and support their descendants, 
leaving more of their genes in the population. It is easy to see that an 
inclination to avoid wastefulness is adaptive and that judges might 
be endowed with just as much of that inclination as anyone else. This 
is not to argue that judges do not have other values, such as justice 
and religion, that may play the greater role in many decisions. The 
point is only that judges may have a taste for efficiency. 
 Because the inefficient effects of a decision are external to an ethi-
cal judge, this theory needs some mechanism for bridging the gap be-
tween seeking efficient results for oneself and seeking them for oth-
ers. Empathy can make the connection. It could be a survival advan-
tage to have the ability to project oneself occasionally into the shoes 
of another, to learn vicariously the dangers of her situation. That 
same empathy, coupled with the distaste for waste, could lead a 
judge to feel uncomfortable with decisions that would leave others in 
inefficient situations.15 
 There is a third argument that judges make the common law effi-
cient, or at least more efficient than the civil law. The idea, which 
can be traced back at least to Hayek, is that the greater prestige and 
independence of judges in a common law system allow them to pro-
tect rights of property and contract more fully than do civil law 
judges.16 Paul Mahoney finds greater growth in common law jurisdic-
tions and attributes it to this cause.17 
                                                                                                                    
 14. Sunk costs are amounts already invested that cannot be retrieved. 
 15. Perhaps Priest and Klein’s results support this theory. They found that the party 
with the higher stake in the outcome prevails more often. See George Priest & Benjamin 
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 28-29 (1984).  
 16. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 523. 
 17. Id. 
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B. Efficiency Resulting from Processes Internal to the   
 Common Law    
 The harder question is whether the common law system of deci-
sionmaking, relying heavily on precedent, could be biased toward ef-
ficiency without any predilections for efficiency within the judges 
making the law. It seems that, in a world where Coasean bargains 
can be struck,18 the more efficient outcome ought to prevail, whether 
that outcome is corn or cows, capital or communes. But there are 
transaction costs, so obtaining efficient rules is not so simple. Before 
examining the mechanisms, however, it should be noted that these 
evolutionary theories do not gainsay the role of human intentionality 
in shaping the law. Darwin did not try to argue that human goals 
had not influenced evolution, for he knew and was inspired by the 
fact that breeders had played a large and deliberate role in the de-
velopment of domesticated animals.19 He showed that natural selec-
tion could work both like and alongside human selection. Similarly, 
judicial preferences play a role in the evolution of the common law, 
but judges’ attitudes are not the whole story either; the system has 
biases of its own. 
 In the common law system, private parties have the power to 
bring suits against other private parties and have the right to have 
those disputes heard by independent, disinterested judges. One spe-
cial feature of the common law is that judges are empowered to make 
new rules for situations not previously addressed by the law. Once 
such a rule is made for a jurisdiction, judges are bound by precedent.  
 Decisions do not always follow precedent, however. Another spe-
cial feature of the common law is that judges, at least those at the 
top of the pecking order,20 can deviate from precedent without suffer-
ing loss of job or income or perhaps even prestige. Moreover, judges 
do not know every previous case. They rely heavily on lawyers to 
bring relevant precedent to light during litigation, and lawyers do 
not find all of the relevant cases.21 Additionally, lawyers may fail to 
cite relevant precedent because they have forgotten their own theory 
                                                                                                                    
 18. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 19. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY 
PSYCHOLOGY (1994). 
 20. See United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme 
Court alone is entitled to declare one of its decisions defunct.”) (Easterbrook, J., dissent-
ing), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004). 
 21. See Hannah v. Peel, 1 K.B. 509 (1945). In Hannah v. Peel, the owner of a house in 
which a brooch was found could have won if the King’s Bench had applied the ordinary 
American rule that mislaid items go to the owner of the locus in quo. It is likely that the 
owner’s lawyer failed to find McAvoy v. Medina, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548 (1866), but it is 
also possible that he felt there was no chance of convincing the King’s Bench to adopt the 
distinction between lost and mislaid items recognized by American courts. 
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of the case.22 It is hard to say whether lawyers today are better or 
worse at discovering precedent than they were in the past. There is 
certainly a lot more precedent to discover; they are looking for nee-
dles in larger haystacks. However, the tools of research at their dis-
posal are much improved. In addition to extensive indexes and di-
gests, search engines enable lawyers to find cases that would have 
eluded lawyers of yesterday. The net result is probably that there are 
fewer opportunities for errors based on ignorance today than in years 
past.23 Nevertheless, errors are still possible. Precedent is not en-
tirely binding, and rules do mutate over time. 
IV.   THE COMMON LAW PROCESS FAVORS EFFICIENT RULES 
 Explicitly applying the mathematics of biological evolution, Robert 
Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser showed that, under reasonable as-
sumptions, a legal system tends toward a condition in which it is 
more often good than bad.24 We cannot conclude that any particular 
common law rule or set of rules is efficient, but the system could lean 
in that direction without the help of judges. Two of Cooter and Korn-
hauser’s key assumptions were that more is spent by litigants pre-
paring briefs against inefficient rules and that inefficient rules are 
litigated more often than efficient ones.25 They left open the validity 
of those assumptions.26 
A. Differential Investment: Litigants on the Side of  
 Efficiency Fight Harder    
 It is not hard to see how differential investment might lead to effi-
cient rules. If one outcome is more efficient than another, by defini-
tion those who gain from that outcome gain more than those who 
                                                                                                                    
 22. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The plain-
tiff’s lawyer failed to make his best argument on appeal even though he had filed pleadings 
that would have allowed that argument. The action was in trespass upon the case, which, 
following Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East. 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707), should have 
allowed the plaintiff to recover damages for interference with his fox hunt without proof 
that he had any property in the animal by first possession. Instead, the decision was ren-
dered on the theory that Pierson needed to prove possession. It is possible, however, that 
the court and lawyers failed to follow Keeble because of an untrustworthy report of the 
Keeble opinion. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 33 (5th ed. 2002). 
 23. At least one experienced lawyer has complained that this has made good judg-
ment and argumentation less important, and therefore has made lawyering less enjoyable. 
(Statement of law firm partner to author.) 
 24. Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 144, 149 (modeling judicial decisionmaking 
as a Markov process). Implausible assumptions are required, however, for evolution to 
eliminate all bad rules. 
 25. See id. at 150.  
 26. Cooter and Kornhauser reached their conclusion that the law might tend toward 
efficiency by making both assumptions, but their discussion of Goodman suggests that one 
might be enough. See id. at 156. It would seem that either should suffice as long as the 
other is not working in the opposite direction. 
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gain from the alternative. If we assume that there are no transaction 
costs to impede collaboration among those preferring the efficient 
outcome, all the gains from the efficient rule will be brought to bear 
on their side of the case. Since the benefits on the efficient side are, 
by definition, greater, more wealth is available to be spent on the 
side of efficiency. With a greater investment supporting the efficient 
rule, the efficient rule can buy better lawyers and more of their effort 
in research and investigation. With more effort and better lawyers, 
there is a greater chance of convincing the judge. The greater odds of 
victory should lead, in turn, to more frequent victories for the effi-
cient outcomes. 
 Of course, transaction costs can prevent some of the beneficiaries 
on the efficient side from joining forces in litigation. To take an easy 
example, suppose that all neighbors benefit from the enforcement of 
a private covenant against a single owner and that the gains to the 
owners of the dominant parcels outweigh the losses to the owner of 
the servient parcel. The servient owner refuses to comply and some 
owners of the dominant parcels bring suit to enforce the covenant. 
Other dominant parcel holders feign lack of interest, though, and re-
fuse to contribute to the suit, with the result that the servient parcel 
holder spends more on the litigation than the plaintiffs. 
 Clearly, there will be many such cases in which transaction costs 
thwart the side of efficiency. But transaction costs can likewise afflict 
the side of the case hoping for the inefficient result. So as long as 
transaction costs are neither systematically greater nor more fre-
quent on the side of efficiency than on the side of inefficiency, the net 
result could be that they only reduce, but do not eliminate, the edge 
that the efficient rules have in litigated cases. 
B. Differential Litigation: Inefficient Decisions Are More  
Frequently Challenged       
 Like the differential investment theory, the “differential litiga-
tion” theory makes use of the fact that there are greater stakes on 
the side of efficient rules. But instead of focusing on the amount 
spent on litigation, this theory says that inefficient rules will be liti-
gated more often. Consequently, more efficient rules will prevail a 
higher percentage of the time. It is this argument that I would like to 
explore in somewhat more detail. 
 Given the variation inherent in a common law system, the control-
ling precedent on any issue may change over time. The question, 
then, is whether there is any way for the more efficient outcomes to 
be the operative precedent for more time than the inefficient out-
comes. Suppose it were the case that an inefficient decision on a cer-
tain set of facts would lead to more cases arising in the future than 
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would arise if the more efficient outcome were reached. To put it in 
numerical terms, suppose that cases involving a particular choice be-
tween two rules will arise ten times per year if the court resolves it 
by adopting the efficient rule. The same sort of case will arise 100 
times per year if the court resolves such situations by adopting the 
inefficient rule. Now suppose also that the court is a random decision 
generator heavily biased toward precedent. The court follows previ-
ous decisions in 999 cases out of 1000 and breaks from precedent in 
one out of 1000. It should be obvious that once the court adopts the 
efficient rule, it will change the rule back to the inefficient rule in 
only one case in a hundred years, on average. On the other hand, 
once the court adopts the inefficient rule, that decision will generate 
1000 cases in ten years, enough cases that the court is likely to 
change back to the efficient rule sometime relatively soon. 
 The analysis of the possibility of reversal is complicated, of course, 
if courts are more likely bound when precedent is recent. That effect 
would reduce the advantage for the infrequently litigated efficient 
rules; it would be harder to get out of the rut. Indeed, this effect 
could be strong enough to overcome the bias in favor of the infre-
quently litigated rule. Nevertheless, it is still possible for infre-
quently litigated rules to prevail for longer than their frequently liti-
gated opposites. 
1.   Some Kinds of Inefficient Rules Are Challenged More Often 
 Supposing that more frequent litigation does lead to more fre-
quent reversal, is there any way for inefficient rules to lead to more 
frequent litigation? I think so. Consider the difference between a 
clear rule and a fuzzy one. In Pierson v. Post,27 the court could have 
awarded title to the first person to have actual control of the fox or to 
the first to have a reasonable chance of capturing it. Had the court 
chosen “first reasonable prospect of capture” as the standard, it 
seems likely that such a fuzzy standard would have attracted many 
subsequent cases for determination. The court instead chose the 
clearer rule and, in doing so, reduced the opportunities for the rule to 
be overturned. The majority showed that it appreciated this point by 
saying that it was making the decision in favor of “certainty,” to 
avoid creating a “fertile source of quarrels and litigation.” If clearer 
rules, that is, more determinate allocations of rights, are more effi-
cient,28 then the greater relitigation of fuzzy rules may bend the law 
toward efficiency. 
  
                                                                                                                    
 27. 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 28. But see Priest, supra note 5, at 68 (“[T]here is no reason to believe that inefficient 
rules are any more or less clear in general than efficient rules.”). 
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 There is a countervailing force that could work against efficiency 
in this example. Since fuzzy, indeterminate rules tend to call for 
more litigation and since some lawyers make a living litigating, they 
have a personal stake in the outcome of cases that pit fuzziness 
against clarity. That personal stake might lead them to fight harder 
on the side of the fuzzy rule or less hard on the side of the clearer 
rule. Assuming that the efforts of lawyers actually have some effect 
on the outcome or that judges share the interests of litigators,29 the 
law will tend toward the fuzzier rule and away from efficiency. If the 
lawyers have an interest in the outcome, the law may advance to-
ward their interests rather than in the direction of clearer rules. De-
spite this countervailing effect, it is still possible that relitigation of 
fuzzy rules would be a strong enough force to lead eventually to clar-
ity and efficiency. 
 2.   The Fee Tail 
 For an example of a relatively clear, but still inefficient, rule that 
has generated litigation, consider the estate in fee tail. For centuries, 
patriarchs have tried to set up dynasties by preventing subsequent 
family members from selling the family assets. One means to this 
end has been to divide ownership temporally—in other words, to give 
each owner an interest that lasts for a limited period of time. Tempo-
ral division of rights prevents each owner from selling the asset out 
from under the following generations and keeps the asset in the fam-
ily through the ages. 
 In England, owners tried to set up such dynastic estates by con-
veying land “to A and the heirs of his body.” The intent was for the 
first tenant to take the land, and then on his death his eldest son 
would take, then on the son’s death his eldest son would take, and so 
on down the line. Thus, transfers “to A and the heirs of his body” and 
similar transfers were intended to create a series of ownerships that 
would prevent each holder from selling or leasing the land for a pe-
riod of time greater than his own life. At a tenant’s death, no matter 
what transfer he had made or indebtedness he had suffered or trea-
son he had committed, the land was to pass unencumbered to his lin-
eal heir. In short, according to the intent of the original transferor, 
no owner could alienate a complete, permanent interest in the land. 
This feature of inalienability made the fee tail or “entail” of 1450 
dramatically different from the fee simple,30 which, by virtue of the 
Statute Quia Emptores, had been freely alienable since 1290. Once a 
fee tail was established, no tenant in tail could sell or otherwise 
                                                                                                                    
 29. Since judges are not paid by the case, it would seem to be contrary to their per-
sonal interest to decide the case in a way that will make more work in the future. 
 30. A fee simple is an estate that lasts potentially forever. 
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transfer full ownership. He could transfer control for the duration of 
his life, but at his death his heir would have the right to possession. 
(a)   The Inefficiency of the Fee Tail 
 This estate is not easy to defend on economic grounds. Of course, 
freedom to transfer on whatever terms transferors desire makes 
them happy, and in addition, that happiness has the salutary secon-
dary effect of maintaining incentives for people to work and save 
rather than consume. But the essence of the fee tail is its extremely 
restricted alienability, and that feature brings with it familiar costs. 
First, when land is inalienable, it might not move to its most appre-
ciative owner. It is possible that family X will enjoy the land more 
than family A, yet there is no way for family X to buy the land. It is 
true that X could have bought the land from O before O created the 
fee tail in A, but that fact is of little consolation once the opportunity 
has passed. It seems extremely likely that, at least in some cases, the 
person having the highest valued use for the land will not discover 
that fact until it is too late to purchase a permanent interest. 
 Second, inalienable land is less likely to be developed to an effi-
cient level. The owner of the entail, A, might see that the land would 
be more productive if it were improved, yet A will hesitate to make 
the investment. One reason for A’s reluctance is that any long-lasting 
investment will be sunk into future generations. Not only is it com-
pletely impractical to move a house to a new location, but the law of 
fixtures turns A’s investment into realty and, once lumber becomes 
realty (again), the law of waste prevents A from detaching the fixture 
from the land. The house, too, is owned in fee tail, which prevents A 
from selling a permanent interest in the house. Thus any investment 
by A is partly an immediate and irrevocable gift to the following gen-
erations—the longer lasting the improvement, the larger the portion 
that is a gift to them.   
 Since A cannot sell the land beyond the tenure of his own life, A 
cannot easily reallocate his investment or liquidate it for current 
consumption. Portability was perhaps less important in the past be-
cause people tended to stay put, but even then an owner’s inability to 
move an asset could cause reluctance to invest in it. Yet another rea-
son for A’s failure to invest in the land is that he lacks the capital to 
do so. Because his fee tail is inalienable, he cannot mortgage the land 
and, since he cannot give a security interest, A is unable to borrow 
the capital he needs.  
 One might argue that if it is clear before he sets up a fee tail that 
O should develop his land, B could trade him different land—land 
less suitable for development—for O to entail. There are a couple of 
reasons we cannot rely on this possibility of exchange to eliminate 
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the inefficiency of the fee tail. First, the land in question might be O’s 
home, and O might not be willing to move to new land. Second, it is 
unlikely that any generation can predict accurately which land will 
need developing three or more generations hence. For an amusing 
example of this inability, review again the two-century-old opinion in 
Pierson v. Post,31 in which the court referred to the Long Island beach 
as “waste and uninhabited land.” For a more infamous example, con-
sider the forecasting that caused the United States government to 
give Native Americans land that contained gold.32 
 Because it is hard to predict new uses and because population 
growth and prosperity often lead to expansion into new lands, the 
market will be unable to determine accurately in advance which par-
cels will never need developing. A valid fee tail estate could have eas-
ily prevented development of land which ought to be developed. Once 
land was entailed, there was no way for the market to correct the er-
ror because the land was inalienable. Only if the market was so far-
sighted that it could anticipate which lands would never need further 
development (if such lands exist) and trade them to O would the fee 
tail have not resulted in reduced development. And even if the mar-
ket could have seen that far into the future and offered O more land 
elsewhere, it is possible that O would have been willing to ignore the 
market’s offer and pay the price of reduced development so that he 
could stay where he was and pass his particular lands down through 
the generations. The result is that enforcement of the original trans-
feror’s intent would very likely result in diminishing the chances that 
entailed lands would be employed most profitably at some point in 
the future. 
 A third, and similarly obvious, cost of the fee tail is that it raises 
transaction costs. Here the transaction is especially unwieldy be-
cause it cannot be completed by private parties. When the owner of 
the entailed land realizes that he might increase the value of the 
land by disentailing it,33 his only hope is to obtain the help of a court. 
Suits to wrest the land from the dead hand of the past are clearly 
costs of the fee tail. 
 Temporal division of rights usually creates wasteful incentives not 
fully cabined by the doctrine of waste. In the fee tail setting, tempo-
ral externalities are less of a problem because the next possessor will 
be the child of the current possessor. But it remains possible that the 
temporal division maintained by the fee tail decreased incentives for 
proper upkeep of the premises. And there were other incentives also 
                                                                                                                    
 31. 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 32. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374-83 (1980) (ex-
plaining that although the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 gave the Sioux land in the Black 
Hills, the government took back the land in 1877 after gold was discovered). 
 33. Disentailing land converts it from a fee tail to a fee simple. 
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created by the fee tail that are arguably inefficient. The fee tail de-
creased incentives for children to treat their parents well because 
their chances of inheriting entailed lands did not turn on their 
treatment of their families.34 In England before 1534, the fee tail also 
reduced the disincentives for treason.35 The treasonous tenant would 
forfeit the land for his life, but his son would still inherit the land 
and might even be well-positioned to start a new battle with the 
King. This may be one reason that Edward IV did not oppose the dis-
entailing opened up by Taltarum’s Case.36 
 There is yet one more inefficiency of the fee tail. The fee tail re-
duced the number of generations that could enjoy controlling who 
would take possession next, separate from the enjoyment of actually 
using the land. At least some, and perhaps many, of those who inher-
ited entailed lands were less happy than they would have been if 
they could have controlled who took next. This point is easy to see in 
those instances where the fee tail heir did not want the land to pass 
to his heir. Although people usually pass their assets to family mem-
bers, they do not always do so, and they do not always pass their 
lands to the eldest male, as is contemplated by the fee tail. In such 
cases, fee tail heirs were less happy because they did not have control 
of subsequent devolution.  
 Even those who want to pass their lands along to their heirs in 
tail might be less happy doing so involuntarily than if they inherit a 
fee simple and have the ability to pass on a fee simple. Suppose that 
you want to set up a fee tail for a succession of heirs. Would you be 
happier if you inherited such an estate and could not do anything to 
control it or if you inherited a fee simple and could pass along only a 
fee simple?37 The answer depends, of course, on your constellation of 
reasons for wanting to set up the fee tail. If you want simply to pro-
vide for your family in perpetuity, you might prefer to inherit the fee 
tail and pass it on, involuntarily. But if, in addition, you want credit 
for having done so, if you want to write your name in the family his-
tory books as one of a series of farsighted providers rather than a 
powerless conduit, you might prefer to inherit a fee simple and will-
fully pass it on. As evidence that there are people who enjoy assert-
                                                                                                                    
 34. “[T]he land being so sure tied upon the heir as his father could not put it from 
him, it made the son to be disobedient, negligent, and wasteful, often marrying without the 
father’s consent, and to grow insolent in vice knowing there could be no check of disin-
herison over him.” FRANCIS BACON, ‘Reading on the Statute of Uses,’ in THE WORKS OF 
FRANCIS BACON 490 (Spedding ed. 1859). 
 35. In that year, the fee tail became forfeitable for treason by statute. A.W.B. 
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 210 n.2 (2d ed. 1986). 
 36. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 22, at 217. This case is discussed below. 
 37. Of course, there are intermediate possibilities, such as the life estate plus remain-
der in fee simple, but even that division can prevent one generation from exercising any 
control over who takes in a subsequent generation. 
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ing control, consider that some owners pay to write wills devising as-
sets to the same persons who would have taken without a will.  
 When one owner exercises the power to control devolution via a 
fee tail, all his heirs lose the power to control devolution and the en-
joyment taken from exercising control.38 Seeing it as an issue of indi-
vidualism, Sidgwick wrote in his Elements of Politics:  
[A]ny such posthumous restraint on the use of bequeathed wealth 
will tend to make it less useful to the living, as it will interfere 
with their freedom in dealing with it. Individualism, in short, is in 
a dilemma . . . . Of this difficulty there is, I think, no general theo-
retical solution: it can only be reduced by some practical compro-
mise.39 
Sidgwick is right that any solution will be a compromise. But theory 
might help us determine the efficiency of the compromise embodied 
in the fee tail, which allows a current owner to control ownership 
long into the future. If there is to be private control of an asset, there 
must be some person who chooses which members of each generation 
will have the rights in that asset. We might, to take two extreme 
possibilities, give that power to control future ownership to any 
owner in any preceding generation who chooses to exercise control, or 
we might give that power to an owner only in the immediately pre-
ceding generation. There are two reasons it might be better to limit 
control of who takes in generation X to the owner in generation W. 
First, a sort of diminishing marginal utility argument might be 
made. It is better to let twenty-two persons in each of the twenty-two 
preceding generations have a small bit of control than allow one per-
son in generation B to have twenty-two times as much control. Sec-
ond, it is not hard to believe as a general matter that the owner in 
generation W would enjoy controlling the ownership in generation X 
because she knows the people in generation X far better than the 
owner in generation B could ever know those people. In short, the ex-
ercise of control of future ownership will be enjoyed more if it is di-
vided across the generations, with each generation allowed to make a 
choice only for the following generation.  
 In sum, the creation of a fee tail bears some resemblance to a de-
cedent’s instructions to destroy his assets after his death.40 In both 
cases, the decedent reduces the value of his assets in order to achieve 
his distributional goals. In the case of instructions to destroy, the dis-
tributional end is that no one gets the asset, so it might be more ac-
                                                                                                                    
 38. Of course, there may be others who do not like having choices. But can they not 
simply do nothing and rely on the rules of intestate succession? 
 39. Henry Sidgwick, Freedom of Bequest, from the Individualistic Point of View, in 
RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 445, 449-50 (1923). 
 40. See, e.g., In re Scott’s Will, 93 N.W. 109 (Minn. 1903). 
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curately called an “antidistributional” end. There is, however, an-
other difference, a practical one. It is unusual for people to ask ex-
ecutors to destroy the assets in their estates. In contrast, it was not 
unusual for owners to create estates in fee tail. Indeed, the desire 
was so strong and broadly shared that the Parliament gave it voice in 
the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus in 1285.41 It is possible, of 
course, that the enjoyment taken by a decedent from reaching his 
distributional goals outweighs the enjoyment lost by the reduction of 
assets. For that reason, we cannot know how often the fee tail is inef-
ficient. Nevertheless, it is clear that entailed lands might never reach 
their best uses because the ancestor has made them inalienable.  
 Economically inclined readers might ask why a transferor would 
do something that is inefficient. The answer is that some people have 
a taste for a certain pattern of donative distribution and are willing 
to pay a price to achieve that pattern. Why they should have such a 
taste can be explained by biology. Because there is diminishing mar-
ginal reproductive return to wealth, when wealth is great enough, it 
is better to allocate some assets to remote generations than to give 
them all to one’s children. The fee tail is one vehicle for satisfying 
that taste.  
(b)   Evolution of the Fee Tail and Subsequent Perpetuities42 
 Through the centuries, judges have had many opportunities to re-
view the validity of transfers attempted by dynastic ancestors. It is 
not clear which position prevailed in the first dispute involving a 
grant that included the language “and the heirs of his body,” but it 
did not take long for judges to hold against the ancestors, freeing the 
lands from the grip of the dead hand of the past. Early judges accom-
plished this circumvention of the grantor’s intent by interpreting the 
grant “to A and the heirs of his body” to allow A to sell a fee simple, 
disinheriting his heir, if he had a living heir. This early interpreta-
tion, which frustrated the dynast’s intent, is sometimes known as the 
“fee simple conditional”43 or “conditional fee.”44 The transferee had a 
fee—complete and alienable ownership—upon satisfaction of the 
condition that an heir be born alive. 
 But property holders with dynastic designs did not disappear. In 
fact, they prevailed upon Parliament to overturn the rule chosen by 
the courts. The Statute De Donis Conditionalibus of 1285 established 
that the recipient of a grant limited to him “and the heirs of his body” 
                                                                                                                    
 41. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 42. In a sense, the medieval fee tail was a perpetuity, a restriction on the power of 
free alienation. SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 208, 212 n.9. 
 43. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 22, at 216. 
 44. SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 66. 
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could not sell the land even after the birth of issue.45 For six decades 
after De Donis, it was debatable whether all subsequent descendants 
would be similarly fettered, but by 1346 it appears settled that they 
were.46 This judicial interpretation, which limited the rights of all de-
scendants, shows that judges did not always decide against inaliena-
bility. The resulting estate, which honors the grantor’s intent to pre-
vent subsequent transfer out of the family and limits descent to a 
limited class of heirs, is known as the fee tail.  
 What ensued was predictable. Because fees tail could not be dis-
entailed, as time passed, more and more lands were tied up. As the 
supply of alienable lands diminished, the value of alienable lands 
probably rose, and the premium to be gained by freeing land from the 
entail increased commensurately. For both this reason and so that 
they could determine the next taker, tenants desired to turn their 
fees tail into fees simple and resorted to legal maneuvers to “bar the 
entail.” Some of these schemes worked and others failed, but in 1472 
the judges in Taltarum’s Case made it clear that one elaborate 
scheme, the “collusive common recovery,” would bar the entail and 
eliminate the interest in the issue.47 After another century, it was es-
tablished that the collusive common recovery would also bar the re-
mainderman and reversioner.48 The common recovery survived in one 
form or another until the nineteenth century.49 By bringing this suit, 
the possessor of the entail could convert his estate to a fee simple, 
freeing the land for transfer and development and thereby increasing 
its value. For our purposes, it matters little whether judges honored 
the collusive common recovery because it was technically unassail-
able or because they did not like the inefficiency of land use that 
might have become increasingly apparent as time passed.50 The key 
point is that the inefficiency created pressures that led to attempts to 
loosen the shackles, and eventually the judges went along and al-
lowed disentailment.  
 But dynasts never say die. In response to the common recovery, 
conveyancers created new devices to prevent alienation. One example 
can be seen in a case from 1495. “‘Land was given in tail, remainder 
in fee, on condition that if the donee or his heirs alienated to the 
damage of the issue, the donor and his heirs might re-enter. And the 
opinion of the court was that the condition was good.’”51 Such “clauses 
of perpetuity” developed over the subsequent century, but by the 
                                                                                                                    
 45. Id. at 82. 
 46. See id. at 83-84. 
 47. See id. at 129-32. 
 48. Id. at 132. 
 49. Id. at 137. 
 50. Id. at 134-35, 208-09. 
 51. Id. at 210 (quoting Y.B. 10 Hen. 7, fol. 11, Mich., pl. 28 (1495)). 
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early 1600s courts once again held in favor of alienability.52 Another 
attempt, the perpetual freehold—which was a transfer to A for life, 
then to his son for life, then to his son’s son for life, and so on in per-
petuity—was curtailed in the 1585 case of Lovelace v. Lovelace.53  
 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the landed and 
powerful continued their attempts to restrict the alienation of their 
lands by descendants. They were aided, in particular, by the Statute 
of Uses in 1536. That statute executed “uses,” beneficial interests 
recognized in equity, making them into legal interests. Because it 
was possible to create many sorts of interests in equity that did not 
previously exist at law, the Statute of Uses made it possible for do-
nors to create new legal interests. For some time, there seemed to be 
no limit on the kinds of successive interests that might be created by 
employing the Statute of Uses. Dictum in Chudleigh’s Case54 ap-
peared to signal a judicial intent to step on the brakes, subjecting the 
new interests created by the Statute of Uses to the same limitations 
on legal interests.55 But subsequent cases “whittled” Chudleigh’s 
Case down to the rule of Purefoy v. Rogers,56 which was not up to the 
task of curbing many dynastic designs.57 In 1620, the court in Pells v. 
Brown58 decisively rejected the rule suggested in Chudleigh’s Case, 
holding instead that executory interests were not subject to the old 
common law rules and that they could not be destroyed by a common 
recovery attempted by the first taker.59 The fact that the dictum in 
Chudleigh’s Case was not followed by subsequent courts is further 
evidence that the judges were not always inclined to constrain those 
who wished to tie up their lands in inalienable estates. 
 Similar evidence suggesting a lack of concern among sixteenth 
century judges for the problems of inalienability appears in the 
mixed decisions in cases involving long-term leaseholds. Although 
some cases had rejected executory limitations of long-term lease-
holds, in Manning’s Case60 and Lampet’s Case61 the courts held that a 
long-term leasehold could be devised to one person for life, with a gift 
over to another person after the death of the devisee for life.62 Be-
cause the executory devise was indestructible, there was nothing the 
life tenant could do to gain the power of alienation over even the 
                                                                                                                    
 52. See id. at 211. 
 53. Id. at 215. 
 54. 1 Co. Rep. 113b (1595). 
 55. SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 218.  
 56. 2 Wms. Saunders 380 (1671). 
 57. SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 218-19. 
 58. Cro. Jac. 590 (1620). 
 59. SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 222. 
 60. 8 Co. Rep. 94b (1609). 
 61. 10 Co. Rep. 46b (1612). 
 62.  SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 221. 
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leasehold interest, much less the fee.63 During the next half-century, 
however, the courts found ways to constrain the dynastic designs 
that employed leaseholds as a vehicle.64 In Childe v. Bailie,65 for ex-
ample, the court held that a term of years could not be divided up 
into a fee tail followed by an executory devise.66 As another example, 
life estates within the leasehold could not be given to persons who 
were not in esse.67 
 The law governing executory limitations of freeholds following 
fees simple was not so clear, however, because fewer cases pressing 
the limits had made it to court.68 In addition, the law that applied to 
interests created in trust was quite unsettled.69 In The Duke of Nor-
folk’s Case70 in 1681, Lord Nottingham announced a new approach 
for testing transfers designed to restrict future alienation.71 He ap-
proved future interests that were certain to vest, or not, within the 
lives of living persons.72 His approach is embodied in the “Rule 
Against Perpetuities,” which prevents a grantor from creating inter-
ests that might vest too far in the future.73 Although it appears that 
Lord Nottingham’s original concerns were more religious than eco-
nomic,74 the Rule has functioned for more than three centuries as a 
key component in the set of rules preventing inefficient restraints on 
alienation.75 
 To sum up the history, dynasts tried to restrict alienation, but the 
courts resisted. Dynasts then persuaded Parliament to force courts to 
honor their intent, establishing the fee tail. Owners of entailed lands 
could see that their interests could be sold or donated or more fruit-
                                                                                                                    
 63. See id. at 221.  
 64. Id. at 223. 
 65. Palmer 48, 333, W. Jones 15, Cro. Jac. 459 (1618-23). 
 66. SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 223. 
 67. Id. at 225. 
 68. See id. at 224. 
 69. Id. at 225. 
 70. 3 Chan. Cas. 1, 2 Swanston 454 (1681). 
 71. SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 225. 
 72. Id. at 225-26.  
 73. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 
64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 707 n.4, 711-12 (1990). Simpson argues that the “rule ‘against’ perpe-
tuities” is misnamed because it permits them, within limits. SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 
232, 284. 
 74. See SIMPSON, supra note 35, at 226. 
 75. It should not be imagined, however, that these rules were sufficient to establish 
complete alienability of land. By the “strict settlement,” a series of parents could prevent 
the next generations from selling the land. This process could be argued to be less harmful 
than the fee tail or other perpetuities—each generation was allowed some choice in the 
devolution—but like the fee tail it curtailed transfer and development. It was not until the 
English Settled Land Act of 1882 that these problems created by the strict settlement were 
minimized by allowing the life tenant nearly complete control over the land. See id. at 285. 
This reform was, of course, statutory, showing that the common law had not to that date 
found a way to eliminate all avenues to inalienability. 
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fully developed if they could bar the entail. So they hired lawyers to 
free their lands from the dead hand of the past. The lawyers brought 
these cases to court, and eventually the courts allowed disentailing 
conveyances. Dynasts attempted many new ways of tying up land, 
but the courts eventually shut most of those down too.  
(c)   Differential Selection Can Lead to Efficiency 
 Perhaps the legal treatment of the fee tail and other perpetuities 
serves as a good example of differential selection. It appears the law 
has drifted toward the more efficient rule of alienability, despite dy-
nasts’ repeated attempts to pull it away. The fact that courts did not 
always hold for alienability indicates that the drift toward efficiency 
is not readily attributable to such an inclination in the judges them-
selves. Likewise, the mixed results in specific cases suggest that in-
creased resources on the side of presumed efficiency were not always 
able to bend the courts in their direction. It appears more likely that 
the pressures of suboptimal land use brought the resulting inefficient 
arrangements back to the courts for judicial invalidation. Private in-
dividuals have persisted in trying to find new ways to achieve their 
dynastic goals, but in doing so they have generated the cases needed 
for their own undoing. 
 It does not matter to this process whether judges are biased to-
ward justice in their decisions. Nor does it matter that judges wished 
to prevent interests that “‘fight against god,’” as Lord Nottingham 
desired to do.76 As long as the social or religious goal adopted by the 
judges is uncorrelated to efficiency, the feedback mechanism exem-
plified here can work. This theory does not rely on courts reaching ef-
ficient decisions more often than inefficient decisions. The decisions 
of the court can be entirely unconcerned with economics and still con-
tribute to a random walk toward efficient rules.77 
                                                                                                                    
 76. Id. at 226 (quoting The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 2 Swanston 454, 460 (1681)). 
 77. This theory should not be taken to deny that there are plenty of reasons that the 
law might not lean toward efficiency. For example, if one side of a legal question is repre-
sented by repeat players in the litigation process, the law may tilt in that direction, even if 
that is not the efficient direction. If the persons on one side of an issue are dispersed, they 
may have a hard time asserting their collective interest and the law may lean away from 
them, even though they are on the side of efficiency. If the interests on the efficient side 
are few but extremely weighty, they might not have an opportunity to influence the law in 
a system that relies heavily on the frequency of litigation. If the judges are inclined to do 
justice, whether distributional, retributive, or otherwise, that inclination can overcome the 
pull to efficiency in any particular case.  
 Although these possibilities exemplify how inefficient rules may survive, they do not es-
tablish that the law cannot drift toward efficiency through the mechanism suggested 
above. If all of these forces are not negatively correlated with efficiency, then efficiency can 
pull the law subtly, in the background, when other forces are not too strong. 
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 3.   A Counterexample—Diving Board Liability 
 Compare the fee tail story from Property to a hypothetical story 
from Torts regarding the liability of hosts for diving board accidents. 
Suppose that a court holds a hotel liable for punitive damages for ac-
cidents stemming from use of the diving board at its swimming 
pool.78 And suppose that hotels in the jurisdiction respond by elimi-
nating their diving boards. If liability for punitive damages is the ef-
ficient decision, we do not have a problem; the diving boards are not 
worth keeping. But if punitive liability is inefficiently high, we can 
see that the common law feedback process might not work to correct 
the decision. If all hotels remove the boards, no cases will arise. 
Without any cases, it will be hard for the common law to change to 
the efficient rule.79 
 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed famously divided judicial 
decisions into those enforcing entitlements with property rules, li-
ability rules, and inalienability.80 When an entitlement is inalienable, 
it cannot be transferred.81 When an entitlement is protected by a 
property rule, it can be removed from the holder only by paying the 
price demanded by the seller.82 When an entitlement is protected by 
a liability rule, it can be taken by anyone willing to pay the price set 
by a court.83 As the fee tail and diving board examples suggest, there 
may be an important connection between the type of enforcement 
and the feedback loop in the common law process. If an initial enti-
tlement of rights is inefficient, inalienability prevents those rights 
from moving. They can be reallocated only by changing the law. 
When an entitlement is protected with a property rule, high transac-
tion costs can make market reallocation difficult.84 In such situations, 
it may be less costly to seek a change in the law. Both property rules 
and inalienability can create incentives to change the law. When ini-
tial entitlements are enforced with liability rules, however, those 
who want the rights can, by the payment of damages, reallocate the 
                                                                                                                    
 78. The damages need not be punitive; any systematic damages greater than actual 
damages will do. 
 79. Although the differential litigation mechanism cannot usually lead to rules with 
efficient incentives, there are two ways that the law might evolve toward rules that create 
efficient incentives. First, it is possible that the persons who suffer the bad incentives will 
recognize that it is in their interest to overcome the free rider problems and convince the 
government to change the rules. Second, it is of course possible for lawmakers (whether 
judges or legislators) to recognize that certain rules have good or bad incentives. Acting on 
that recognition, they can tailor the law to achieve efficient ones. 
 80. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 81. Id. at 1092.  
 82. Id.  
 83. See id.  
 84. See id. at 1106. 
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rights to themselves; it is not necessary to change the law.85 Thus it 
is possible that suits to change the law will arise less often when li-
ability rules are employed than when rights are protected with in-
alienability or property rules. This connection merits further exami-
nation. 
 In any event, there are some inefficient decisions that will live 
short precedential lives because they create opportunities for their 
own reversal. Other inefficient decisions will last longer because they 
create incentives for parties to keep themselves out of the situations 
that would give rise to a case offering an opportunity for reversal. 
The feedback loop that is built into the common law decisionmaking 
process has the potential for correcting some errors, but there are er-
rors it cannot reach. In general, decisions that leave parties in ineffi-
cient situations will generate opportunities for reversal, whereas de-
cisions that create inefficient incentives may cause parties to avoid 
the situations that would give rise to cases that could overturn the 
inefficient rule. Inefficient rules of property law are likely to create 
opportunities for litigation. Moreover, inefficiencies in allocation of 
specific realty are likely to grow, rather than diminish, over time. In-
efficient tort rules are more likely to drive parties away from the be-
haviors that would lead to liability, thus reducing the opportunities 
for litigation of the entitlement. Thus, we should expect this common 
law process to have a more beneficial influence on property rules 
than tort rules.86 If strong, stable property rules are a key to produc-
tivity, this point suggests an alternative theory for explaining why 
the common law generates more wealth than the civil law.87 Perhaps 
the process itself deserves as much credit as the insulation and pres-
tige of judges.  
 4.   The Tail of the Fee Tail Tale 
 One might think that the tale of the fee tail is over, but a new 
chapter is being written today. Once again, as in 1285, legislative ac-
tion is loosening the constraints imposed by judges. The Rule Against 
Perpetuities, the most recent judicial limitation on dynastic designs, 
is under attack. Legislation has been passed in a number of states 
exempting assets held in trust from the operation of the Rule.88 Why? 
Part of the answer lies in the rise of the perpetual trusts and the 
competition across jurisdictions for trust dollars. This is a rent-
seeking story—a race to the bottom. South Dakota started the com-
                                                                                                                    
 85. It is not even necessary to go to court when the defendant is willing to pay the 
price the parties anticipate the court will set. 
 86. Stake, supra note 6, at 1447, 1477-92. 
 87. See Mahoney, supra note 6. 
 88. Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2101 (2003). 
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petition by abolishing the Rule for its trusts.89 Abolition of the Rule 
gave local banks an advantage in attracting the assets of those want-
ing to set up dynasties.90 Conversely, banks in other states faced a 
potential loss of business and a flow of capital out of the state.91 
Other states have subsequently followed suit.92 As of 2002, there 
were fourteen states that had sufficiently limited or abolished the 
Rule Against Perpetuities to allow dynasts to create perpetual 
trusts.93 Thus, modern statutes make it possible to achieve much of 
what the barons wanted to do so many centuries ago. 
 Although the fee tail is not really needed today in many states be-
cause dynasty trusts can be created, perhaps some state will see the 
possibility of gaining the upper hand in the competition for trust dol-
lars by recreating the fee tail. Once one jurisdiction adopts it for per-
sonalty, it could prove popular and spread to other jurisdictions fight-
ing for financial accounts. Such a recreation of the fee tail for person-
alty could operate to the benefit of those early-adopting jurisdictions, 
while reducing the net wealth of society. 
 Whether the fee tail is recreated in its traditional form or merely 
in the form of dynasty trusts matters little. The question is whether 
the common law courts will come to the rescue, once again, to save 
assets from inalienability. Perhaps they will.94 But perhaps there is 
no need for them to come to the rescue. Two of the problems stem-
ming from inalienability evaporate when wealth is held in trust. We 
do not have to worry about another family being unable to buy the 
trust res because the trustee can sell it to them. We do not have to 
worry about lack of development because the trustee can mortgage 
the land for capital to invest in the land. The issue as to whether the 
enjoyment of control can be limited to one generation is still a con-
                                                                                                                    
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 2103. 
 92. Another reason for the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities is that it is so 
difficult to master that lawyers fear malpractice liability. When the privity requirement 
prevented would-be devisees from suing the scrivener, lawyers had little to worry about. 
See id. at 2100-01. But as the privity requirement has fallen, the fear of malpractice has 
risen, and with it the incentive to abolish the Rule. See id. at 2101. For an argument that 
violations of the Rule should not lead to malpractice liability, see Stake, supra note 73, at 
773-75.  
 93. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 22, at 334. 
 94. Is there a better solution than invalidation? Some might say that we should not 
abolish the fee tail, but rather tax it to internalize the social costs. This will help, but it 
will not solve the problem. If there are social costs to the fee tail (exceeding its benefits), 
adding a tax will reduce the frequency of the fee tail, but the losses will remain in those 
cases where the fee tail is created. O is already willing to pay a tax, in the form of lawyer 
fees and reduced value, to create the fee tail. Increasing that tax will reduce the frequency, 
but it is still possible for the losses from diminishing marginal reproductive utility to be 
larger than the tax. In such cases the fee tail will be created, and the asset held in fee tail 
will generate less wealth than if it were held in fee simple. 
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cern, but the answer to that question, as a matter of efficiency, re-
mains unclear. 
 This last point shows one more beneficial attribute of the behavior 
of the common law. If courts strike down inefficient arrangements, 
the dynasts have to keep trying different ways to reach their goals. 
Eventually, through trial and error and perhaps increasing levels of 
complexity, they may hit on an approach that generates fewer prob-
lems for society, one that is not so inefficient. It remains to be seen 
whether these modern variations will generate cases and, if so, 
whether the courts will find ways of ignoring the original intent. But 
the common law process does provide at least some hope that, if wel-
fare losses are large, a new means of disregarding intent, a modern 
analogue to the ancient collusive common recovery, will be recog-
nized by the courts. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The common law competes with other legal systems—on efficiency 
as well as other criteria—and the outcome of that tournament is far 
from decided. In addition to external forces, there are a number of in-
ternal means by which the common law may generate efficient rules. 
Judges can actively seek efficiency, or favor it without knowing they 
are doing so. Even without judicial help, the common law process it-
self may have the capacity to generate efficient rules. Because the ef-
ficient decision generates greater wealth, litigants on the side of effi-
ciency may spend more to promote their position. Because of asym-
metries in stakes, cases may be settled more often when rules are ef-
ficient. In addition, some sorts of inefficient rules may sow the seeds 
of their own undoing by creating obvious wastefulness that can be 
prevented only by changing the law. 
 The fee tail and other attempts to create property that cannot be 
alienated outside the family provide examples of legal rules that cre-
ate opportunities for their own reversal. Time and again, creative 
donors imposed restraints on alienation. Time and again, those suf-
fering the inefficiencies of those restraints sought judicial relief, and 
sometimes, but only sometimes, they got it. The inefficient rule led to 
inefficient land use, which led to litigation, which led to reversals of 
the rule. Thus, some inefficient decisions fall quickly because they 
create opportunities for their own reversal. Other inefficient deci-
sions, such as excessive diving board liability, last longer because 
people avoid the situations that would give rise to additional cases. 
The common law decisionmaking process contains a feedback loop 
that can correct some errors, but cannot reach others.  
 In general, decisions that leave parties in inefficient situations, 
such as decisions in cases involving property law, create opportuni-
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ties for reversal. Decisions that create inefficient incentives, such as 
decisions in cases involving tort law, cause parties to avoid the situa-
tions that would become lawsuits. We should expect this common law 
process to have a more efficient influence on property rules than tort 
rules.95 Because efficient property rules are important to a healthy 
economy, the common law process may have an internal advantage 
that gives it a big leg up in its external competition with other legal 
systems. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 95. Stake, supra note 6, at 1477-92.  
